AN EXPERIMENT IN THE TEACHING OF FIRST AND SECOND YEAR LATIN

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The narrow limits of space at my command will oblige me to speak with the greatest brevity. I shall also be forced wholly to omit much that I should like to say. It is impossible to describe two years of work in a dozen pages.

The experiment of which I am to speak came about in the following way. I have always regarded school and college work in any given subject as forming merely two stages in one and the same continuous journey. Complete success, it was clear, could come only from a community of interest and aim on the part of the directors of both. It therefore behooved each side to learn as much as possible about the work of the other. I have endeavored to do this, for my own part, by frequently visiting schools; and, when I have been asked to take the class, as has often happened, I have most readily done so,—and never without learning something from the experience.

On the other hand, I have felt that, unless the work of the college professor were based upon nothing sound, *he* also might have helpful suggestions to make about the first stage of the common journey. I therefore, soon after the beginning of my work at Cornell, taught a section of freshmen, in the presence of as many advanced college and graduate students as chose regularly to come. Freshmen in the autumn are simply high-school students, with the knowledge which they had in June, minus what they have forgotten in the summer. The juncture was therefore an absolutely close one. Now I found that these young people could not only learn what I wanted to teach them, but could actually learn to do certain things, e. g., to understand Latin at hearing, better than the graduate-student members of the class. They were easier material to mold, because they were caught younger. I very soon became convinced that the younger they were caught the better, and that the teachers who were most

likely to make Latinists or mar them were the first-year teachers,—
with the second-year teachers not far behind.   I also came very soon
to see that all that my graduate students and I could accomplish for
sound theory in the seminary could be assimilated by my freshmen.

Later, at Cornell and in Chicago, I gave training courses to under-
graduates and graduates who intended to become teachers.   In these
courses I set forth my theories.   But it was only the imaginary young
person that the class and I were teaching.   I wanted to have the
actual young person before us.   Accordingly it was arranged, with
the warm approval of the President of my university and of Pro-
fessors Dewey and Owen as representing pedagogy and the pro-
jected University High School, that, when the university should
possess a suitable building, I should combine theory and practice by
teaching a class of beginners in the presence of a teachers' training
class.   The time came with the opening of our University High
School Building two years ago.   I carried a class of beginners through
their first year.   At the end of that period, I found that I could not
bear to stop, but was constrained to go on with my beginners for one
year more, in order that I might learn how far the work of the first
year had really been a preparation for the work of the second, and
that I might see how to make it so at points where it should prove
not to have been.   I have thus covered the first two years of high-
school work.   It has been a pleasure to me in the past that I have
from time to time been asked to take part in the yearly meetings of
the Michigan Schoolmasters, and have been told that I might regard
myself as an honorary member of that body.   I have done better
now.   I have been, for two years, a genuine Illinois schoolmaster.

But I should be sorry if you were to fancy me to think that I had
been doing nothing but teaching during these two years.   I have
been doing a great deal of learning.   And, though I had at the outset
an abundant sympathy with the teachers of the schools in the diffi-
culties which they had to solve, my sympathy is at least more intel-
ligent now, because I know these difficulties at first hand.   They are
mainly two.   The first comes from the rising tide of non-studious
interests in school life, and the general relaxation of the older ideas
of discipline and independent effort.   I have experienced in my own
person the fact that the teacher must largely supply the necessary

energy to his pupils, and that, in Quintilian's words, "while his strict-
ness should not go so far as to become forbidding, his good nature
must stop short of ineffectiveness": *Non austeritas eius tristis, non
dissoluta sit comitas.* If I have anywhere failed to reach what I aimed
at, it is here. The second difficulty comes from the relatively enor-
mous reduction of the daily period from fifty-five actual minutes to
forty, or a ratio of 11 to 8—a reduction which, on the basis of thirty-
four weeks in the year, amounts to a cutting out of a little over nine
and one-half weeks, or two full months and a quarter. The teacher
certainly has his hands full in the shrunken year! On the other
hand, I have not found the average young student to be lacking in
intelligence, or in interest in the things that called for its exercise.
On this point, the creed which I have always held has come through
trial unshaken.

The beginner's book which I used in the first year was an unpub-
lished one of my own, first built up, day by day, in the process of
teaching one of my own children. In mimeographed form, the
sheets had been used in several schools, in this city and elsewhere,
and had passed through several editions, with a complete rewriting
each time. It was now in its fourth revision.—This book contained
its own grammar, woven into the lessons.

It is obvious that I can not describe the work of the first year,
unless I am to omit all description of the work of the second year.
Let me only say, then, that I taught freely what I believed, and that
my young people seemed to have no difficulty in understanding it.
It is the teacher, not the beginner, who finds trouble in adopting new
points of view. The teacher has something to change; the beginner
has nothing. I aimed at associating forces with forms, and at so
modeling my sentences that these forces should inevitably be felt by
the student. This meant *context.* Thus the Imperfect, when first used,
had an accompanying adverb of past time with it, and a contrasting
Present ("*recently* you were doing so and so; *now* you are doing
thus and thus"). Our beginner's books sin terribly in this regard,
giving us Latin that does not mean what it is intended to mean
(like *vulnerabat*, "was wounding," in a sentence intended to mean
"the soldier wounded his enemy with a sharp stone," and English
which, since the Perfect has not yet been reached, has to be trans-

lated by an impossible Imperfect (like "he chased away the wolf and saved the children," which has to be translated by Latin that means "he was chasing away the wolf and was saving the children").[1]   I endeavored also to make the Latin exercises consist, as far as possible, of connected material, and, as early as possible, to begin a connected story, associating it with school-boy experiences and amusements, while using the vocabulary of Caesar.   And throughout I tried to present constructions as *the expressions of ideas*,—ideas which we are ourselves constantly expressing in our daily lives, and by ways which are in remarkable degree parallel to the Roman ways.

We can not avoid the teaching of syntax.   As to the question whether we should desire to avoid it, I must permit myself a word. We who teach languages, and especially we who teach the older languages, have a great advantage, which we at present hold in much too timorous a fashion.   That which it belongs to us to profess is not only a literature, but a noble and beautiful observational science, for which any recitation-room affords a laboratory, and any text we are reading a body of apparatus of considerable compass.   And again, that which it belongs to us to profess is not only a science, but a noble and beautiful literature, which is deeply woven into the world's consciousness, or subconsciousness.   A noble science and a noble art!   There is nothing else in the whole range of human study that offers such a combination.   But we timidly urge the claims of literature alone, leaving the very name of science to our bolder brothers over the way, who write magazine articles to set forth the value of their subjects as against ours, on the ground that the study of language teaches only appreciation, while the study of the natural sciences teaches sound habits of thinking, and sound conceptions of the world as it is.   Latin and Greek will never be able to defend themselves successfully until their full claims are boldly stated. But these claims *can not* be stated, as things are today, because there exists an extraordinary intellectual stagnation as regards the scientific side of our work.   We *have* no science.   With a few weeks of study, any worker in natural science who should also have the gift of linguistic discernment could riddle our syntactical systems through and through.   Our grammars and textbooks are full of a sort of

[1] These are actual examples from two beginner's books.

dexterous manipulation, which takes the place of thinking. We have not tests for anything, or even the idea that such things are possible. Ask a working chemist to determine whether a given well-known chemical substance is present in a given mass submitted to him, and he can do so by a definite test or series of tests. Ask us to determine by a definite test whether a given Subjunctive clause is of a certain kind, and we should in general not even know what was meant. And so our grammars are full of impossibilities, and our textbooks are full of notes which a child of fourteen, in whom the scientific sense has once been awakened, can easily refute from the material which the same text affords him. I am not speaking at random, but out of my own experience. And if I am speaking plainly, it is because I wish to have said my say before the great silence falls. We of the classical side of education are not to succeed by science alone, but we are not to succeed without it. And today we *have* no science, and only the exceptional man has even any curiosity. Fifty and seventy-five years ago, with methods woefully wrong, there existed an eager desire to understand, and a conviction that understanding was possible. Today, after right methods have begun to be reached, we are satisfied with anything that will enable us to go through the forms of explanation, and dislike nothing so much as to have our intellectual repose disturbed.

These are strong words which I have used about grammars, textbooks, and children. I owe you proof for my assertions. Two examples must suffice.

In Caes. *B. G.* ii. 27, the following occurs:

Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent . . . . At hostes etiam in extrema spe salutis tantam virtutem praestiterunt ut, cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent, his deiectis et coacervatis corporibus, qui superessent ut ex tumulo tela in nostros coicerent . . . .

The five editions of Caesar in common use treat the mood of *qui procubuissent* as follows: Allen and Greenough call it a "Subjunctive of characteristic," and refer to the sections for this construction in the various grammars. Westcott's edition does the same. Kelsey's does not name the construction, but refers to the

sections for the "Subjunctive of characteristic." Towle and Jenks do the same. Harkness and Forbes say nothing of the construction. For *qui superessent* below (evidently a similar clause) Allen and Greenough say "characteristic clause." Kelsey asks: "Why Subjunctive ?" The other editions have no notes.

Now when, with my little people, I came to this place, I asked one of them what kind of a clause *qui procubuissent* was. She answered "a determinative clause"—a phrase which in my nomenclature means a clause having the same office as a determinative (demonstrative) pronoun—a clause telling *who, what*, etc., is meant—a *defining* clause. I said, "the notes say it is a clause of characteristic." The young girl answered "it is a determinative clause. It simply tells whom Caesar means." "Why, then," I asked, "is it in the Subjunctive ?" "By attraction," she answered. "What about *qui superessent?*" I asked. "The same," she answered. "Here," said I, "is a clear difference of opinion. Let us see if you can find any evidence in the Latin of your next lesson."

The next day we read, at the beginning of the next paragraph (28), the sentence:

Hoc proelio facto, ... maiores natu . . . . omnium qui supererant consensu legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt.

When the whole section had been finished, I asked if anyone had found any evidence upon our question, and was told that *qui supererant* was in itself just like *qui superessent;* and that the mood of the latter (and likewise of *qui procubuissent*) must therefore be due to some influence from outside,—which was quite true. The young students were right, the makers of the books,—some of them also writers of grammars,—were wrong. And the same evidence (the whole business lying within a space of twenty lines) was open to the older people as to the children! Could any better proof be wanted that we have not yet, in the field of Latin syntax, reached a science ?

Another example will show how, in the study of the cases, one may deal with syntax as an observational science. The instructive appendix at the end of the Towle and Jenks Caesar tells us, at §86, that "An Ablative translated *in accordance with* is classed by Gildersleeve and Allen and Greenough as specification, by Bennett and West

as manner, by Harkness as cause." The illustration given is *moribus suis*, *B. G.* i. 4. Now Latin syntactical science can hardly have advanced very far if five grammars give three entirely different explanations for the same construction. Let us see if the matter is really so hopeless.

Moribus suis does not betray anything about the classification of the usage. We must then wait for further light. In i. 8 we come upon *more et exemplo populi Romani*, evidently of similar nature. Again no light. In i. 50 we come upon the similar *instituto suo*. Still no light. But in i. 52 we find *ex consuetudine*, for which the teacher may now point out the parallel *consuetudine sua*, *without* preposition, in ii. 19. Here there is light. The preposition, which is a separative one, clearly shows that the Ablative expresses the general habit *from which* the individual act mentioned proceeds. The construction is exactly like that which is seen in our occasional phrase "proceeding from." The teacher may now reinforce the lesson in two ways. He may say that, except with a few fixed phrases, like *consuetudine*, *more* or *moribus*, *exemplo*, *instituto*, a separative preposition is *always* used, in prose, to express the idea of "in accordance with," as in Cicero's *ex senatus decreto*, *Cat.* i. 2. 4. And he may also say that the *poets*, loving, for the sake of variety, to put in prepositions where they are not used in prose (just as much as to do the opposite where prose requires them), are much given to using *de* and *ex* with *more*, as in Virgil's *de more*, *Aen.* i. 318, and *ex more*, *Aen.* v. 244; that, indeed, Virgil actually uses this word more frequently *with* the preposition than without it. It would seem then, that the construction is an easy one, which a first-year student, even, could be brought to put into the right place and relation for himself; and it would seem, too, that no one of the three explanations given by the five grammars was the right one.

Let me, now, since I can of course deal with but a small part of the actual handling of the work, confine myself to one class of constructions; and, inasmuch as the Subjunctive is generally found to present more difficulty than anything else, let this be the field selected.

Throughout the year I felt, for *all* Latin constructions, cases as well as moods, the need of a chart. I wanted something which should constantly bring before the eyes of my students the whole

mass of syntactical apparatus, arranged according to their relations. This led in time to my drawing up, as a substitute for a part of what I desired, a sheet on which all the common Subjunctives were given, arranged by families, with the dependent constructions opposite the independent ones from which they were descended. Each student was furnished with a copy, which he folded and kept in his Caesar. I reproduce the sheet here, on a scale necessarily too small for easy reading.

The names used for the various constructions are meant to be working descriptions,—condensed, but exact and complete. Thus the student, in saying that a given clause is a volitive substantive clause, has in effect said that it expresses an act as *wanted*, and that it stands in the relation of subject or object to the verb on which it depends. In two words he has described both the *feeling* and the *function* of the clause.

Instead of the phrase "clause of characteristic," I have used the phrase "descriptive clause." The clause thus named is simply a complex adjective; and the office of the ordinary adjective is to *describe*. We *simplify* terminology and bring to consciousness the common value of several constructions, if we say descriptive adjective, descriptive Genitive and Ablative, descriptive *qui*-clause, and descriptive *cum*-clause of situation (*not* descriptive adjective, Genitive and Ablative of quality, clause of characteristic, and descriptive *cum*-clause, with three different names for one and the same power).

A few words of justification for the classifications made are necessary.

The word "potential" is used in the sense of "expressing possibility or capacity." The phrase "ideal certainty" means "expressing what is recognized *in the mind* as a certainty in a given case, though not an actuality." The Subjunctive conclusion is an example. The term "conclusion with condition omitted," commonly used of such a Subjunctive when standing alone, does not reach the essential feeling of the mood, and is also inexact, since it is just as appropriate for a great many Indicatives. The name "Subjunctive of natural likelihood" belongs to a construction which, while not forcing itself upon the attention in the high-school Latin texts, is common in the Latin of daily life, as the corresponding idiom (auxiliary "should"

CONSTRUCTIONS FROM SIMPLE (SINGLE) FORCES INHERITED FROM THE PARENT SPEECH

INDEPENDENT	DEPENDENT

FROM THE SUBJUNCTIVE OF THE PARENT SPEECH

Volitive Subjunctive. Negative nē.[1] 500–505.[2]

Proposals, Suggestions, or Exhortations. 501, 2.
 	
 *† Commands or Prohibitions. 501, 3.
	Clauses of Plan or Purpose. Connective quī, quō, ut, or nē. 502, 2.
	 Volitive Substantive Clauses:
	   a) After[3] verbs[4] of Will or Endeavor. Connective (ut)[5] or nē. 502, 3, a.
	   b) After verbs of Hindrance, Prevention or Check. Connective nē, quōminus, or quīn.[6] 502, 3, b.
	   c) With est and an Adjective, or a verb or phrase of similar force. Connective (ut) or nē. 502, 3, c.

*† Questions of Deliberation, Perplexity, or Inquiry for Instructions. Negative nōn.[1] 503. *† Exclamations of Surprise or Indignation. Negative nōn. 503.	Clauses of Fear or Anxiety. Connectives nē, that, and ut (less frequently nē nōn), that not. 502, 4. Dependent Questions of Deliberation, Perplexity, or Inquiry for Instructions. 503

* Generalizing Clauses in 2d Singular Indefinite. Negative nōn. 504, 2.

Clauses of Imaginative Comparison, with connectives meaning as if. 504, 3.

Anticipatory Subjunctive. Negative nōn. 506–509.

(Had disappeared from Independent Sentences before the times of the literature, being driven out by the Future Indicative)	† Anticipatory Descriptive Clauses. 507, 1.
	 Substantive Clauses of Anticipation:
	   a) With ut after verbs of Expecting. 507, 2. a.
	   b) With quīn after verbs of Doubt, if these are negatived. 507, 2, b.
	 Indirect Questions of Anticipation, after verbs of Expecting, Knowing, Fearing, etc. 507, 3.
	 Clauses of Anticipation with connectives meaning before (antequam, priusquam, etc.). 507, 4.
	 Clauses of Anticipation with connectives meaning until (dum, dōnec, and quoad). 507, 5.
	 All Dependent Clauses expressing Futurity to the Past (Past-Future Clauses). 508, 509.
	   In other Dependent Clauses the Anticipatory Subjunctive has been driven out by the Future Indicative.

FROM THE OPTATIVE OF THE PARENT SPEECH

Optative Subjunctive. Negative nē.[1] 510, 511.

*† Wishes. Often introduced by utinam. Negative nē, but with utinam sometimes nōn. 511	*† Substantive Clauses of Wish, after verbs of Wishing, Desiring, etc. Connective ut or nē. 511, 2.

Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety. Negative nē or nōn. 512, 513.

*† Independent Statements and Questions of Obligation or Propriety. Negative nē or nōn[1] for Statements, nōn for Questions. 513, 1.	Indirect Questions of Obligation or Propriety, with connectives meaning why. Negative nōn. 513, 1. Relative Clauses of Obligation or Propriety, with connectives meaning why or that. Negative nōn. 513, 2. *† Relative Clauses and ut-Clauses after words meaning worthy, fit, etc. 513, 3, 4. *† Substantive Clauses of Obligation or Propriety. Positive without connective,[7] negative with nē or quīn. 513, 5

Subjunctive of Natural Likelihood. Negative nōn. 514, 515.

* Statements and Questions of Natural Likelihood. 515, 1	* Relative Clauses and ut-Clauses of Natural Likelihood. 515, 2. * Substantive ut-Clauses of Natural Likelihood. 515, 3.

Potential Subjunctive. Negative nōn. 516, 517.

*† Statements and Questions of Possibility or Capacity, 517, 1; but only:
   Where a negative is implied; or
   In the Second Singular Indefinite; or
   With quis, aliquis, vix, facile, or forsitan.
	Indirect Questions of Possibility or Capacity, corresponding to 517, 1.
	 Potential Relative Clauses, after verbs expressing or implying Existence or Non-Existence. 517, 2.
	 * Potential Substantive Clauses with ut, after fierī potest. 517, 3.

Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty. Negative nōn. 518, 519.

Statements and Questions of Ideal Certainty, 519, 1; including:
   *† Softened Statements. 519, 1, b.
   Subjunctive Conclusions, namely,
     Less Vivid Future; Pres. or Perf. Subj. 580.
     Contrary to Fact; Imperf. or Past Perf. Subj. 581.
	Indirect Questions of Ideal Certainty. 519, 1.
	 *† Descriptive Clauses of Ideal Certainty. 519, 2.
	 * Clauses of Ideally Certain Result, with ut or ut nōn. 519, 3.
	 Substantive Clauses of Ideal Certainty:
	   [a) After verbs of Bringing About or Existence, with ut or ut nōn. 519, 4, a.]
	   *b) After verbs of Doubt or Ignorance, with quīn. 519, 4, b.

LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE

SPECIAL LATIN CONSTRUCTIONS, OF COMPOSITE ORIGIN, OR OF ENTIRELY NEW GROWTH

INDEPENDENT   DEPENDENT

CONSTRUCTIONS OF COMPOSITE ORIGIN

Subjunctive of Actuality (Fact) in "Consecutive" Clauses. Negative nōn. 520–526

1. Descriptive Clauses of Actuality (Fact), with Relative of any kind (quī or quin, cum, ubi, unde, etc.). 521, 1.
   Out of these (simply descriptive) clauses grew the following kinds, with quī and cum:

   With quī: [Restrictive Relative Clauses. 522.]
   Causal or Adversative quī-Clauses. 523

   With cum: a) Descriptive cum-Clauses of Situation. Especially frequent in Narration. 524.
   b) Descriptive cum-Clauses of Situation, with additional Causal or Adversative idea. 525.
   c) (Purely) Causal or Adversative cum-Clauses. 526.

2. Clauses of Actual Result (Fact); with ut, ut nōn, or quīn 521, 2.

3. Substantive Clauses of Actuality (Fact):
   a) After verbs of Bringing About or Existence, with ut or ut nōn. 521, 3, a.
   b) After expressions of Doubt or Ignorance, with quīn. 521, 3, b.

Subjunctive in Conditions. Negative nōn. 573–582.

Less Vivid Future, Pres. or Perf. Subj. 580.
Contrary to Fact; Imperf. or Past Perf. Subj. 581.
(For Subjunctive Conclusions, see Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty, in the column of independent constructions.)

Subjunctive of Proviso. Negative nē. 529.

Clauses of Proviso. Connectives modo, dum, and dummodo. 529.

Subjunctive of Request or Entreaty. Negative nē. 530.

† Subjunctive of Request, Entreaty, or Prayer, 530, 1.   Substantive Clauses of Request, Entreaty, or Prayer. Connective (ut) or nē. 530, 2.

Subjunctive of Consent or Indifference. Negative nē. 531, 532.

*† Independent Subjunctive of Consent. 531.   Substantive Clauses of Consent. Connective (ut) or nē. 531, 2.
*† Concessions of Indifference. 532.

Dependent Concessions of Indifference   Connective quamvīs, quamlibet, or ut. 532, 2

CONSTRUCTIONS ARISING FROM OTHERS BY ANALOGY AND EXTENSION

Subjunctive of Indirect Discourse. 533–538.

a) Indirect Commands and Prohibitions, representing Independent Imperatives or Volitive Subjunctives of the Direct Discourse. Negative nē. 538.
b) Indirect Questions of Fact, representing Independent Indicative Questions of the Direct Discourse. Negative nōn. 537.
c) Subordinate Clauses in Indirect Discourse representing Dependent Indicative Clauses of any kind in Direct Discourse. Negative nōn. 535, 1, 536 — From one type of these are developed the
   Subjunctive of Quoted Reason, with words meaning because. 535, 2, a.
   Subjunctive of Rejected Reason, with words meaning not that 535, 2, b.
   Verbs which would be in the Subjunctive in Direct Discourse will of course be in the Subjunctive in Indirect Discourse as well.

Subjunctive by Attraction. 539.

Subjunctive by Attraction, in Clauses of any kind, depending upon a Subjunctive or Infinitive. Negative nōn. 539

Subjunctive of Repeated Action. 540.

Subjunctive of Repeated Action (earliest examples mostly with cum) Negative nōn. 540.

*General Statement of Fact, in 2d Singular Indefinite. Negative nōn. 542.

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⁴ "Verbs" is to be taken as meaning "verbs or other expressions."
⁵ Brackets mean that the ut is purely *formal*, and may be used or not, as the speaker chooses.
⁶ In dependent clauses of any kind, quīn is employed only *after a negative*, expressed or implied.
⁷ But ut is used after mereō and mereor.

or "ought") is in English. Compare *qui sciam?* Ter. *And.* 791, with "how should I know?" and *quare desinat esse macer?* Catull. 89. 4, with "why should he cease to be lean?"="naturally he would continue to be lean." And even in the high-school texts, beside two unmistakable cases in *Mil.* 13. 35, many examples lie in the neutral field which belongs equally to natural likelihood, possibility, and ideal certainty. Thus *quis crederet* in Verg. *Aen.* iii. 186 suggests all three forces, "no one would have been likely at that time to believe," "no one could then have believed," and "no one would then have believed."

The ideas expressed by the names of the leading families,—will, anticipation, wish, obligation or propriety, natural likelihood, possibility, ideal certainty,—are perfectly familiar, and, with the idea of fact, form the backbone of what we have to say in our daily speech. Indeed, if for Latin we add the Subjunctive of fact in consecutive clauses, in indirect discourse, and by attraction, we could for a time get on very well with these general forces alone, and perhaps in the long run clarify things by this simple form of beginning. As for the classification itself, it is surely destined for ultimate general acceptance. Our grammars are already passing over to it, one taking up one point and another another, here obviously, there in substance under a different phraseology.

All the possible evidence with regard to the syntax of a given construction in a given language may conveniently be thought of as falling under two heads: (1) evidence within the language to which it belongs; (2) evidence outside of the language to which it belongs, that is, evidence afforded by another language, or other languages, of the same family. These two kinds of evidence will generally (not quite always) be found to confirm each other. The first, when it exists, is of course surer; but the confirmation given by the second, where the two agree, lends great weight to the conclusion; and the second sometimes makes a highly probable suggestion where the first is lacking.

Now the case called the Latin Ablative (to take an example) presented great difficulty a hundred years ago, after more than two thousand years of study. It seems to us today that it ought to have been easy to see that it could not be historically a single case, since it

conveyed ideas so different as those expressed by our English prepositions *from*, *with*, and *in*.   Indeed it surely *was* possible, by the comparison of constructions with prepositions and corresponding constructions without them, to reach the sure conclusion that the case possessed separative (*from*, etc.), sociative (*with*), and locative (*in*, *upon*, etc.) powers.   But in point of fact the solution did not come in this way, but from the comparison of the Latin Ablative forms and uses with the forms and uses of Sanskrit and Avestan, which possessed eight different cases where Latin had but six.   It came to be seen that the parent speech had eight cases, and that Latin, inheriting these, mixed what had formerly been three distinct cases, the Ablative, the Sociative, and the Locative.   This was not fully understood until 1846.   Nobody would now wish to go back to the times of ignorance, dispensing with the results of comparative study.

But the case is precisely similar with the Latin Subjunctive.   It can be proved to be a composite mood (just as the Ablative is a composite case), being made up of remains of a Subjunctive and an Optative, possessed by the parent speech, and inherited by the ancestors of the Romans.   The forces of the Latin Subjunctive can be made out from Latin alone, by the necessities of meanings in given contexts, or by the parallelism of meanings in constructions of differing form.   To illustrate: It is impossible to treat fairly the ordinary Subjunctive examples with *priusquam*, "before," or *dum*, "until," without recognizing that the mood conveys (like the occasional English *shall* with *before* or *until*) the idea of expectation, anticipation, or whatever we may choose to call it.   But immensely strong confirmation is brought to this view when we look at Greek, Sanskrit, Avestan, and Old Persian uses, and find that they, in the earliest remains, have even an *independent* use of the Subjunctive in the sense of a mere future,—a sense of expectation or anticipation. Again, we can surely, on the strength of Latin alone, assign the Subjunctive in *omnibus frugibus amissis, domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent*, B. G. i. 27, to the Potential Subjunctive ("nothing with which they could . . . . "), and not, as the editions of Allen and Greenough, Kelsey, Wescott, Harkness and Forbes, and Towle and Jenks do, to purpose or characteristic.   For the very common type of construction seen in *B. G.* iv. 29, *neque enim naves erant aliae*

quibus reportari possent, "for there were no ships left by which they could be taken back," obviously corresponds in meaning; and this contains a form of the verb *possum,* which unquestionably conveys, in *itself,* the potential idea. But this conclusion is strongly confirmed when one finds that Greek, Sanskrit, Avestan, and Old Persian have clear independent potential uses of the *Optative* Mood, and also dependent constructions (of the Optative) exactly corresponding to the one in *nihil erat quo . . . . tolerarent,* as in *Od.* iv. 559,

οὐ γὰρ οἱ πάρα νῆες ἐπήρετμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι,
οἵ κέν μιν πέμποιεν ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης,

"for he has no ships fitted with oars and no crews, that could bear him over the broad ocean-ridges." Or, once more, one could surely make out from Latin alone the existence of a Subjunctive of obligation, propriety, or reasonableness, by the parallelism of sentences in such examples as *quid facere debuisti? Frumentum ne emisses,* Cic. Verr. 3. 84. 195, where the second sentence answers the first; or *non triumphum impedire debuit . . . . sed postero die . . . . nomen deferret,* Liv. xlv. 37, where *debuit* and *deferret* are balanced against each other. And one could see the same force in the dependent *quare timeret* in the sentence *sed eo deceptum quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret, neque sine causa timendum putaret,* B. G. i. 14, by comparing *quare timeret* with *timendum* ("ought not to fear on account of anything that he had done, and ought not to fear without any reason at all"). And, if one were still in doubt, one could not hesitate after seeing the beautifully illustrative phraseology in Livy xl. 43. 12, *quid est cur illi vobis comparandi sint,* "What reason is there why they should be compared to you," for which the ordinary form would be *quid est cur vobis comparentur.* But the conclusion is strongly confirmed when one sees that Greek has a freely-used construction (not yet recognized as such in our grammars and grammatical treatises), in which the Optative clearly conveys the idea of obligation, propriety, or reasonableness, as in

Τί δῆτ' ἄν, ὦ γύναι, σκοποῖτό τις
τὴν Πυθόμαντιν ἑστίαν; Soph. O. T. 964.

"Why, indeed, my wife, should one look to the hearth of the Pythian seer?" (Jebb's translation).

I have found that young students learn with a considerable amount of ease to classify ordinary Subjunctive examples rightly, pointing out (and this helps) the exact place in the table where they are described, and so getting the whole scheme more and more clearly fixed, and pictured, in mind. But let us suppose that, in occasional cases, the student answers, "I don't know." The dialogue will then be somewhat as follows.

Accidit ut esset luna plena, B. G. iv. 29.

What kind of a clause is *ut esset?* "I don't know." "Run down your table (begin always on the left, at the top). Does *esset* express something *willed?* "No." "Something *anticipated?*" "No." "Something *wished?*" "No." "Does it express an *obligation?*" "No." "A *likelihood?*" "No." "A *possibility?*" "No." "Does it express an *ideal certainty* (a certainty of the mind)?" "No." "Does it express a *fact?*" "Yes." "Right. Now what is the relation of the clause *ut esset* as a whole to *accidit?*" "It is the *subject* of *accidit.*" "What do we call such a clause?" "A *substantive* clause." "Then this is a clause of *fact,* and *substantive.* "Does it belong in 1, 2, or 3?" "In 3." "Under which of the two subheads?" "Under *a*)."

Tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est, uti ab iis nationibus qui trans Rhenum incolerent legati ad Caesarem mitterentur, B. G. ii. 35.

"What kind of a clause is *qui . . . . incolerent?*" "I don't know." "What does it tell you about the antecedent *iis?*" "It tells *who* are meant by *iis.*" "Right. What do we call such a clause?" "Determinative; but the mood ought to be Indicative." "True. It follows, doesn't it, that the reason of the mood in this clause must lie *outside* of the meaning of the clause itself. What do you see, outside of the clause, to influence it?" "*Uti mitterentur.*" "Then the cause of the mood is . . . . " "Attraction." "Where do you find that in the table?" "Right-hand side, near the bottom."

Of course the main verb, by its very meaning, often at once shows the force of the mood, as in *postulavit ne . . . . adduceret, B. G.* i. 42 (volitive substantive clause), and *quid hostes consili caperent, exspectabat, B. G.* iii. 24 (indirect question of anticipation; if put directly, the question would be *quid . . . . capient*).